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Abstract 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) routinely publishes details of the 
evidence and reasoning underpinning its recommendations, including its social value judgements. To 
GDWH KRZHYHU 1,&(¶V VRFLDO YDOXH MXGJHPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR HTXLW\ LQ WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI KHDOWK DQG
health care have been less specific and systematic than those relating to cost-effectiveness in the 
pursuit of improved sum total population health. NICE takes a pragmatic, case-based approach to 
developing its principles of social value judgement, drawing on the cumulative experience of its 
advisory bodies in making decisions that command respect among its broad range of stakeholders. 
This paper aims to describe the social value judgements about equity in health and health care that 
NICE has hitherto used to guide its decision making. To do this, we review both the general social 
value judgements reported in NICE guidance on methodology and the case-specific social value 
judgements reported in NICE guidance about particular health care technologies and public health 
interventions. 
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1. Introduction 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) routinely produces evidence-based 
guidance on health care technologies and public health interventions which influences National Health 
Service (NHS) and broader public sector resource allocation decisions in England and Wales. Among 
similar organisations elsewhere in the world, NICE is unusual in that it publishes details of the 
evidence and reasoning underpinning its decisions, including references to the social values that the 
Institute expects its advisory bodies to take into account when making recommendations (NICE, 
2008a). NICE is arguably the first organisation in the world to do this systematically in routine 
resource allocation decisions, as opposed to selectively or in special µone off¶ stakeholder consultation 
exercises, in the health sector or indeed any other sector of public policy making. NICE can thus be 
seen as a pioneering example of the µaccountability for reasonableness¶ framework for public 
resource allocation advocated by the bioethicist Norman Daniels, with its four requirements of: (i) 
publicly accessible decisions and the rationales for them, (ii) reasonableness of rationales in the 
sense both of giving reasons and applying relevant principles, (iii) the possibility of challenge through 
appeal and of revision of decisions, and (iv) the presence of mechanisms to ensure that the foregoing 
requirements are met (Daniels, 2000; Daniels and Sabin, 2008).  
 
The values embodied in NICE decisions are ultimately those endorsed by its Board, but they have 
been informed by government policies, the experience of Board members, research (some initiated by 
NICE), the experience of members of advisory committees, reports of specific NICE workshops, 
SXEOLF DQG RWKHU FRQVXOWDWLRQV DQG WKH UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV RI WKH 1,&( &LWL]HQV¶ &RXncil (NICE, 
2008a). 1,&(¶V DSSURDFK WR VRFLDO YDOXHV LV QRW GULYHQ E\ D VLQJOH SKLORVRSKLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH e.g. 
needs-based, duty-driven, utilitarian) but is pluralistic in that it draws on several traditions. It is also 
pragmatic, even casuistical1, in that it operates through trying to take account of the particular 
circumstances of each individual case and the many parties having stakes in its procedures and 
decisions, it builds up cumulative records of individual cases to guide action, and it tries to ensure that 
the operational consequences of its decisions are manageable. 
 
NICE has developed a clear and detailed set of principles for assessing µcost-effectiveness¶, i.e. how 
to measure costs and health benefits and compare them in order to offer value for money ways of 
improving health. These include social value judgements about the appropriate construction and use 
of the quality adjusted life year (QALY) as a summary measure of health gain that can be compared 
between different individuals with different health conditions, the appropriate treatment of costs such 
as productivity costs and informal care costs falling outside NHS budgets, and the appropriate 
benchmark range of incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) to be used for judging whether a 
decision option has an expected cost per QALY gained that can be considered cost-effective. 
 
The general requirement is that recommended interventions of all kinds (including technologies, 
guidelines and programmes, in both health care and public health), have an ICER at or below the 
prevailing threshold range of values set by NICE. However, this is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for an intervention to be recommended by NICE. The Institute Board has instructed its 
advisory bodies that cost-effectiveness should not be the sole basis for their decisions. Other factors 
also need to be taken into account. There will normally be a number of pragmatic considerations to be 
ERUQH LQPLQG VXFK DVRUJDQLVDWLRQDO LPSDFWVRI WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶V LQWURGXFWLRQDQGFRQWLQXHGXVH
other policy objectives (such as supporting industrial innovation), and the overall size of impacts on 
population health and budgets. Furthermore, there are also a range of considerations relating to 
fairness in the distribution of health and health care between individuals, and the circumstances under 
which it is fair to place more weight on a QALY for one person rather than another. These are often 
grouped together as considerations of µequity¶, as distinct from considerations of efficiency or cost-
effectiveness in pursuing the objective of improved sum total population health.  
 
Several potential equity considerations are described in official NICE documentation (NICE, 2008a). 
However, while the principles related to cost-effectiveness are relatively explicit, those covering equity 
concerns are generally less specific. Furthermore there is little guidance on how these equity 
                                                          
1
 Casuistry: case-based ethical reasoning (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988). NICE adheres to ethical principles, which it tries to 
make as clear as possible, but also recognises that the circumstances of individual cases are often critical in determining the 
right thing to do. Cumulative records of individual cases over time are therefore also a source of guidance. 
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concerns should be balanced against concerns for cost-effectiveness. This paper aims to shed light 
on this important but underdeveloped VXEVHWRI1,&(¶V social value judgements (SVJs). It has two 
main aims: 
 
1. To describe the substantive SVJs about equity in health and health care that NICE uses 
to guide its decision making. 
2. To compare the general SVJs reported in NICE guidance on methodology with the case-
specific SVJs reported in NICE guidance about particular health care technologies and 
public health interventions. 
 
The paper starts with a background section, giving a brief overview of NICE, why it implemented a 
policy of making transparent 69-VDQGZK\1,&(¶V69-VDERXWcost-effectiveness are more specific 
than its SVJs about equity. It then proceeds to describe 1,&(¶VSVJs about three different types of 
equity concern. First, concern that health services should be distributed according to need. Second, 
concern that there should be no discrimination against health service recipients on the basis of their 
personal or social characteristics. Third, concern to reduce unfair health inequalities. In each case, we 
describe both general SVJs and case specific SVJs in separate sections. We then summarise and 
discuss our findings. 
 
Our descriptions of existing NICE SVJs are based on a review of methodology guidance 
documentation and selected published items of guidance from the NICE Technology Appraisal 
Committee (TAC) about particular health care topics, and from the NICE Public Health Interventions 
Advisory Committee (PHIAC) about particular public health topics. The items of guidance were 
selected purposively to illustrate topics where NICE advisory bodies had to make difficult and unusual 
case-specific SVJs about equity without the benefit of pre-existing SVJ guidance of a detailed and 
prescriptive nature7KLVSXUSRVLYHVHOHFWLRQZDVGRQHRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHDXWKRUV¶RZQexperience2, 
plus additional suggestions from two long serving TAC and PHIAC members with extensive 
experience across a broad range of topics. Full titles of the official items of guidance used as the 
basis of our descriptions of 1,&(¶VJHQHUDO69-VWRJHWKHUZLWKWKHVKRUWHQHGLWDOLFLVHGWLWOHVWKDWZH
use in the rest of the paper, are as follows: 
 
1. Directions to NICE from the Secretary of State for Health (SoS Directions; NHS, 2005) 
2. Social Value Judgements: Principles for the development of NICE guidance, 2nd edition 
(SVJ Guidance; NICE, 2008a) 
3. Guide to the methods of technology appraisal, 2nd edition (TA Guide; NICE, 2008b)  
4. Methods for the development of NICE public health guidance, 2nd edition (PH Methods; 
NICE, 2009a) 
5. Appraising life-extending, end of life treatments (EoL Guidance; NICE, 2009b).  
 
We also consulted relevant publications authored by senior NICE officials, but placed less emphasis 
on these on the basis that they represent personal or at most semi-official views about NICE SVJs 
rather than the official views of NICE ratified by the Institute Board. 
  
                                                          
2
 RC served as member of TAC from 2002-7 and PHIAC from 2007-9, AJC served as Vice Chair of NICE from 1999-2003 and 
Chair of NICE R&D Committee from 2007-10, and PL served as Clinical and Public Health Director of NICE from 1999-2011.   
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2. Background 
NICE came into existence in 1999. In September of that year its chair, Sir Michael Rawlins, explained 
his priorities in the St Paul Healthcare Annual Lecture as follows³,ZRXOGHPSKDVLVH«WKDW1,&(LV
in many respects 'virtual' and will rely on the help and goodwill of colleagues in Royal Colleges, 
professional associations, the health service and universitiHV WKURXJKRXW (QJODQG DQG :DOHV « 
perhaps most important of all, we need to earn and retain the confidence of patients and the public, 
KHDOWK SURIHVVLRQDOV DQG PDQDJHUV DQG WKH KHDOWK FDUH LQGXVWU\´ 1,&( ZHEVLWH, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/whatwedo/corporatepublications/annualreports/Article.asp?a=336, 
accessed 15 June 2011). A concern for transparency and explicit addressing of issues of value 
judgement, whether scientific or social, informed the procedures developed from the very beginning 
regarding NICE technology appraisals and, from 2005, public health interventions.  
 
Transparency and openness of NICE procedures and its reasons for making particular 
recommendations were seen as critical for the credibility of NICE guidance. This included credibility to 
the clinical and managerial professions in the NHS, to patients and the organisations representing 
their interests, to the research community on whose evidence much was to depend, to the industries 
whose products NICE appraised, to the Secretary of State and Parliament and ± by no means least 
important ± to the general public and the media. These interest groups are commonly called 
µVWDNHKROGHUV¶NICE needed stakeholder involvement because it was and still is, despite its enormous 
growth since 1999, largely a virtual organisation. Stakeholders are required to sit on its board as non-
executive directors and to operate its advisory bodies, especially its three technology appraisal 
committees6WDNHKROGHUVDOVRVLWRQ1,&(¶VFOLQLFDOJXLGHOLQHGHYHORSPHQWJURXSVZKLFKDVVHVV and 
make recommendations based on the evidence available on the guideline topic. Stakeholders are 
also needed to join and attend advisory groups, the patient involvement unit, and ad hoc groups (to 
develop technical advice on methods of appraisal, for example); and to observe processes and follow 
procedural guidance µLn the field¶. For stakeholders, it is important for NICE to have authority in its 
scientific judgements (as assessed by scientists) and in its social value judgments (as assessed by 
other stakeholders); to be seen to be independent of industry, politicians, patient pressure groups, 
and special pleaders of all kinds; to be comprehensible to all stakeholders; and to demonstrate 
humanity by manifestly understanding the concerns of patients, families and caregivers, and the wider 
public. It is also important to be practical in the sense of issuing guidance that can be implemented, 
with clear and realistic timelines, effective communications (both in their process and in what they 
communicate), and a sense of do-ability at the workplace (Culyer, 2005). 
 
NICE cares about the processes by which its conclusions are reached and its recommendations are 
PDGH ,W LV LQSDUWLFXODUFRPPLWWHG WRZKDWDUHVRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDV µGHOLEHUDWLYHSURFHVVHV¶ LQ
developing its advice (Culyer and Lomas, 2006). A deliberative process requires the fullest 
identification of legitimate stakeholders (including the general public) in the decision making process 
and its consequences, the fullest practicable opportunities for them to comment on both the design of 
the process and the substantive discussions conducted within that process, and the fullest practicable 
participation in the decision making process itself. It further requires as much transparency as is 
consistent with managing an effective process that delivers good decisions in a timely fashion and 
that does not violate principles of privacy or confidentiality. A deliberative process is not only one in 
which the participants combine evidence of various sorts with values and other considerations; it is 
also a process through which new knowledge is revealed (for example from the experience, both 
personal and professional, of participants) and during which it is possible for people to change their 
minds in the light of new evidence and argument. The importance of deliberative processes becomes 
especially significant when the evidence base is unreliable and the social values at stake are 
ambiguous and contested, as may be the case more frequently in public health than elsewhere. 
 
Initially, NICE found it difficult to address issues of equity with any degree of sophistication, other than 
in its procedures for publishing information and allowing stakeholders to comment and be consulted, 
which were well ahead of usual practice in such public decision making. The guidance in the first 
edition of its Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal (NICE, PDNHVWKLVYHU\FOHDU³«
an additional QALY is of equal value regardless of other characteristics of the individuals such as their 
socio-demographic details, or their pre- or post-treatment level of health. This position reflects the 
absence of consensus regarding whether these or other characteristics of individuals should result in 
GLIIHUHQWLDO ZHLJKWV EHLQJ DWWDFKHG WR 4$/<V JDLQHG´ SDUD  6LQFH  1,&( KDV SXW
substantial effort into finding more effective means of addressing matters of equity. The Citizens¶ 
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Council was established to assess how the general public would address these issues through a 
deliberative process. The Council comprises thirty members of the general public who meet for three 
days to respond to specific questions posed by the Institute. The initial process was evaluated by the 
Open University (http://www.hta.ac.uk/nihrmethodology/reports/1566.pdf) and more recently the 
overall experience has been described by Littlejohns and Rawlins (2009). 
 
In 2005, NICE and the Department of Health agreed to co-fund two research projects to investigate 
the social value of a QALY. Both of these projects were completed in 2008 and concluded that the 
public probably did want to weight QALYs but how to develop these weights remained uncertain 
(Dolan et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2010). The second edition of 1,&(¶V JXLGH WR WKH PHWKRGV RI
technology appraisal states that: ³7KHInstitute considers equity in terms of how the effects of a health 
technology may deliver differential benefits across the population. Evidence relevant to equity 
considerations may also take a variety of forms and come from different sources. These may include 
general-population-generated utility weightings applied in health economic analyses, societal values 
elicited through social survey and other methods, research into technology uptake in population 
groups, evidence of differential treatment effects in population groups, and epidemiological evidence 
RQULVNVRULQFLGHQFHRIWKHFRQGLWLRQLQSRSXODWLRQJURXSV´TA Guide, p.18) 
 
At the time of writing, the UK coalition government that came to power in 2010 is consulting on 
proposals to reform the way NICE operates and in particular to LQWURGXFH D QHZ V\VWHP RI µvalue 
based pricing¶ for branded medicines (Department of Health, 2010). This proposed new system will 
mean that, at least in the case of branded medicines, NICE will provide the evidence base for price 
negotiations. The proposals also include potentially important changes to NICE social value 
judgements about equity ± for example, they suggest giving more weight to QALYs accruing to 
patients with relatively severe illnesses which impose a relatively high burden of disease (Department 
of Health, 2010). However, we do not review these proposals in this paper since they have not been 
finalised and do not reflect official NICE guidance on SVJs at the time of writing. The SVJ issues we 
discuss in this paper are likely to remain highly UHOHYDQW WR 1,&(¶V RSHUDWLRQs in the future 
environment of value based pricing, and in any case are of continuing international interest given 
1,&(¶VSLRQHHULQJUROHLQWKLVDUHQD 
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3. Equity concern for distributing health services according to need 
3.1 General SVJs ± as reported in general NICE guidance  
7KH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶V'LUHFWLRQV to NICE require that its evaluations of health care interventions 
VKRXOG WDNH LQWR DFFRXQW DPRQJVW RWKHU WKLQJV ³WKH GHJUHH RI FOLQLFDO QHHG RI SDWLHQWV ZLWK WKH
FRQGLWLRQRUGLVHDVHXQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQ´SoS Directions). Rawlins et al. (2010) describe severity of 
LOOQHVV DV RQH RI WKH µVSHFLDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ WR ZKLFK 1,&(¶V DGYLVRU\ bodies have given µspecial 
weighting¶, reflecting evidence that many people value the health gains accruing to severely ill 
individuals more highly than equal-sized health gains accruing to those whose illness is relatively mild 
(Shah, 2009).  
 
In January 2009, NICE issued supplementary advice to its Technology Appraisal Committees (TACs) 
to be taken into account when appraising life-extending end of life treatments (EoL Guidance). This 
indicated that, if certain criteria are met, it may be appropriate to recommend the use of such 
treatments even if their ICERs exceed the upper end of the range normally considered acceptable. 
The TACs are instructed to consider the impact of giving greater weight to the health gains achieved 
in the later stages of disease, by assuming that the extended survival period is experienced at the full 
quality of life anticipated for a healthy individual of the same age. They are also instructed to consider 
the magnitude of additional weight that would need to be assigned to the health gains in order for the 
ICER to fall to an acceptable level. This has been argued to reflect the special value society places on 
prolonging the lives of terminally ill patients (Rawlins et al., 2010). Some aspects of the 
supplementary advice were revised following a five week public consultation exercise. The criteria 
that need to be satisfied in order for the advice to be applied are currently as follows (EoL Guidance): 
 
 ³The treatment is indicated for patients with a short life expectancy, normally less than 24 
months; 
 There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the treatment offers an extension to life, 
normally of at least an additional three months, compared to current NHS treatment; 
 The treatment is licensed or otherwise indicated, for small patient populations.´ 
 
The NICE SVJ guidance does not say anything about whether the unavailability of alternative 
effective treatments might affect the acceptability of a giYHQ WHFKQRORJ\¶V FRVW-effectiveness. The 
supplementary advice regarding end of life treatments proposed initially included, in addition to the 
above, the following criterion: 
 
 ³No alternative treatment with comparable benefits is available through the NHS.´ 
 
This criterion was used in the end of life test cases. For example, in the appraisal of sunitinib for renal 
FHOO FDUFLQRPD WKH &RPPLWWHH QRWHG WKDW WKH WHFKQRORJ\ SURYLGHG D µVWHS FKDQJH¶ LQ WKH ILUVW-line 
treatment options for advanced and/or metastatic disease (NICE, 2009c). Eventually, however, the 
criterion was dropped from the supplementary advice following the public consultation. Among other 
things, comments made during the consultation exercise included pragmatic concerns about what 
types of treatment could be FRQVLGHUHG DVDQ µalternative¶ (for example, any treatment theoretically 
available, or only those that have been approved by NICE, or only those that are used routinely). 
 
Finally, NICE SVJ guidance explicitly addresses the issue known in the literature as the µrule of 
rescue¶ RU WKH µLGHQWLILDEOH YLFWLP HIIHFW¶ (McKie and Richardson, 2003; Cookson et al., 2008). The 
second edition of the SVJ guidance GRFXPHQWVWDWHV³7KHUHLVDSRZHUIXOKXPDQLPSXOVHNQRZQDV
the µUXOHRI UHVFXH¶ WRDWWHPSW WRKHOSDQ LGHQWLILDEOHSHUVRQZKRVH OLIH LV LQGDQJHUQRPDWWHUKRZ
much it costs « NICE recognises that when it is making its decisions it should consider the needs of 
present and future patients of the NHS who are anonymous and who do not necessarily have people 
to argue their case on their behalf. NICE considers that the principles provided in this document are 
appropriate to resolve the tension between the needs of an individual patient and the needs of 
present and future XVHUVRI WKH1+67KH ,QVWLWXWHKDVQRW WKHUHIRUHDGRSWHGDQDGGLWLRQDO ¶UXOHRI
UHVFXH¶´ (SVJ Guidance, pp.20-21). 7KLVJXLGDQFHRQ µUXOHRIUHVFXH¶ZDV LVVXHGLQ IROORZLQJ
deliberation and consultation about this specific issue including a Citizens¶ Council meeting in 2006, 
and predates the supplementary guidance on life-extending end of life treatments issued in 2009. 
However, as the SVJ guidance makes clear, NICE sees these as separate issues and does not seek 
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to favour identifiable patients who need an intervention being appraised by NICE over anonymous 
patients who need other forms of care. 
 
3.2 Case-Specific SVJs ± as reported in NICE guidance on health care technologies 
and public health interventions 
As noted above, since early 2009 NICE has instructed its advisory bodies to consider giving special 
weighting to the health gains offered by life-extending treatments for individuals in the later stages of 
terminal illness. However, there are cases of NICE giving special consideration to such treatments 
that pre-date this supplementary guidance. For example, in the appraisal of riluzole for motor neurone 
disease, the TAC FRQVLGHUHG WKH ³VHYHULW\ DQG UHODWLYHO\ VKRUW OLIHVSDQ´ RI DIIHFWHG SDWLHQWV DQG
recommended the use of this technology despite the fact that the ICER estimates ranged between 
£34,000 and £43,500 per QALY gained (NICE, 2001). Similarly, trastuzumab combination therapy 
was recommended for use in the treatment of advanced breast cancer even though the manufacturer 
provided an ICER estimate of £37,500 per QALY gained. This was GXH LQ SDUW WR WKH 7$&¶V
REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW ³LPSURYHPHQWV LQ VXUYLYDO RI WKLV PDJQLWXGH GXH WR WKHUDSHXWLF LQWHUYHQWLRQ KDYH
UDUHO\EHHQUHFRUGHGLQZRPHQZLWKPHWDVWDWLFEUHDVWFDQFHU´1,&(02). 
 
Between January 2009 (when the supplementary guidance was issued) and April 2009, nine 
technologies were considered by NICE in the context of the end of life criteria, because they were 
associated with a life expectancy of less than 24 months and the estimated ICERs exceeded the 
range normally considered acceptable (Longson and Littejohns, 2009). All nine related to treatments 
for cancer. Three of these technologies were considered not to fulfil all of the criteria ± bevacizumab 
for renal cell carcinoma because it was licensed for other indications that have large eligible patient 
populations; lapatinib for breast cancer and cetuximab for head and neck cancer because the 
available evidence suggested that neither offered a life extension of at least three months. For the 
remaining six technologies, it was assumed that the extended survival period would be experienced at 
the full quality of life anticipated for a healthy individual of the same age, in accordance with the 
supplementary guidance. In addition, the TAC also considered the magnitude of implicit weightings 
that would need to be assigned to the health benefits offered by the technologies in order for the 
ICERs to fall within the normal threshold range. For example, in the case of sunitinib for renal cell 
carcinoma, it was noted that the health gains would need to be valued 70 percent higher than those 
achieved in other circumstances for the ICER to fall to £30,000 per QALY gained. Three of the six 
technologies were eventually recommended as treatment options: sunitinib for the first-line treatment 
of renal cell carcinoma (most plausible ICER without end of life weighting: approximately £50,000 per 
QALY gained), lenalidomide for multiple myeloma (more than £43,800 per QALY gained), and 
sunitinib for gastrointestinal stromal tumours (£31,800 per QALY gained). 
 
We did not identify any clear-cut examples of TACs giving explicit additional weight to QALY gains 
from treatments for severe but non-terminal illnesses. However, there are cases where TACs have 
taken severity of illness into account in a rather different way: by making a special effort to identify a 
small sub-group of severely ill patients for whom the technology might be considered cost-effective. In 
the appraisal of omalizumab for severe persistent allergic asthma, for instance, the Committee was 
persuaded that the technology could be considered cost-effective for a small sub-group of severely ill 
patients, even though the ICER estimates for the broader patient group exceeded the range normally 
deemed acceptable (NICE, 2007). The guidance document explained this decision as follows: 
³2YHUDOO WKHUHIRUH WKH &RPPLWWHH FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKHUH ZHUH D QXPEHU RI FRQVLGHUDWLRQV ZKLFK
meant the ICER was higher than acceptable for patients with severe persistent allergic asthma. 
However, the Committee was persuaded that for a narrowly defined severely affected group of 
asthma patients, at an elevated risk of asthma-related mortality, cost-effective treatment with 
omalizumab was possible, if therapy was discontinued in non-responders at 16 weeks and if vial 
ZDVWDJHFRXOGEHPLQLPLVHGWRUHGXFHFRVWV´1,&(, 2007). 
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4. Equity concern for non-discrimination 
4.1. General SVJs  
NICE must comply with legislation on human rights, discrimination and equality, at both the scoping 
and appraisal stage (TA Guide, p.10). In particular, the 2010 Equality Act specifies nine µprotected 
characteristics¶ which cannot be used as a reason to treat people unfairly: age; disability; gender 
reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex, 
and sexual orientation. The current version of the UK public sector equality duty, which came into 
force on 5 April 2011, states that public bodies must have due regard to the need to: eliminate 
unlawful discrimination; advance equality of opportunity between people who share a protected 
characteristic and people who do not share it; and foster good relations between people who share a 
protected characteristic and people who do not share it  
(http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/equality-act/equality-duty/, accessed 22 September 2011). 
 
$V ZHOO DV WKHVH QLQH ³SURWHFWHG FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´ 1,&(¶V FRQFHUQ IRU QRQ-discrimination extends to 
three further characteristics: conditions associated with stigma, behaviour-dependent conditions, and 
socio-economic status (SVJ Guidance, pp.23-25). NICE ensures that ³SDWLHQWVDUHQRWGHQLHGDFFHVV
or have different or restricted access, to NHS care because of their race, disability, age, sex/gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, beliefs, or socioeconomic or other status´ (SVJ Guidance, p.23).  
 
NICE seeks to treat the same those who are the same in a relevant respect ± a horizontal equity 
REMHFWLYH&XO\HU7KH,QVWLWXWH¶Vgeneral principle is that ethnicity, age, gender, sexuality and 
other social characteristics should not affect decisions about whether to recommend a given 
intervention. However, these characteristics may be taken into account if there is clear evidence that 
they are indicators for the risks or clinical effectiveness of that intervention (SVJ Guidance). More 
specifically, SULQFLSOHRIWKH1,&(69-JXLGDQFHVWDWHVWKDW³1,&(FDQUHFRPPHQGWKDWXVHRIDQ
intervention is restricted to a particular group of people within the population (for example, people 
under or over a certain age, or women only), but only in certain circumstances. There must be clear 
evidence about the increased effectiveness of the intervention in this subgroup, or other reasons 
relating to fairness for society as a whole, or a legal requirement to act in this way (SVJ Guidance, 
p.25). 
 
NICE also seeks to treat differently those with different needs ± a vertical equity objective (Culyer, 
)RUH[DPSOH LW³VKRXOGWDNHVSHFLDODFFRXQWRIWKHQHHGVRIGLVDEOHGSHRSOHZKLFKLQFOXGHV
whether there are obstacles that might prevent them from benefitting from NICE guidance´ SVJ 
Guidance, p.23). However, similar considerations have not been explicitly applied to other 
characteristics that may be indicative of obstacles to benefitting from NICE guidance (such as 
socioeconomic status or religious beliefs). 
 
1,&(H[SOLFLWO\GRHVQRWGLVFULPLQDWHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHFDXVHRILOOQHVVRUKRZµGHVHUYLQJ¶RIWUHDWPHQW
an individual may be. In particular, ³1,&( VKRXOG QRW SURGXFH JXLGDQFH WKDW UHVXOWV LQ FDUH EHLQJ
denied to patients with conditions that are, or may have been, dependHQWRQ WKHLU EHKDYLRXU´ SVJ 
Guidance, p.25). This would include conditions that may have been contracted or exacerbated due to 
WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V OLIHVW\OHRURFFXSDWLRQ ,Q OLQHZLWKSULQFLSOHKRZHYHU ³LI WKHEHKDYLRXU LV Oikely to 
continue and can make a treatment less clinically effective or cost-effective, then it may be 
DSSURSULDWHWRWDNHWKLVLQWRDFFRXQW´SVJ Guidance, p.25). In part, this reflects the general principle 
that the NHS ought to distribute health care according to need, rather than desert.  +RZHYHU1,&(¶V
position also UHIOHFWV WKH IDFW WKDW LW LV ³RIWHQ LPSRVVLEOH LQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO WR GHFLGH ZKHWKHU WKH
FRQGLWLRQZDVGHSHQGHQWRQ WKHLU RZQEHKDYLRXURUQRW´ SVJ Guidance, p.24). Further, taking into 
account the cause of illness may entail discrimination on grounds of gender (for example, where a 
behavioural health risk is associated with male-dominated occupations) or socioeconomic status (for 
example, where a behavioural health risk is more prevalent amongst low income individuals).   
 
NICE also advises that it should evaluate µRUSKDQGUXJV¶treatments for rare conditions) ³LQWKHVDPH
ZD\DVDQ\RWKHU WUHDWPHQW´ SVJ Guidance, p.20). It also considers that the standard approach to 
assessing cost-effectiveness is appropriate for the evaluation of conditions associated with stigma (for 
example, sexually transmitted diseases), although it expects its advisory bodies to consider the 
possibility that ³VWLJPDPD\DIIHFWSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXUVLQDZD\ that changes the effectiveness of an 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ´ (SVJ Guidance, p.24).  
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4.2 Case-Specific SVJs 
There is rarely any explicit discussion of non-discrimination principles in the µconsiderations¶ section of 
NICE appraisals. This is because non-discrimination principles are used mainly to rule out of 
consideration any decision options which might discriminate against certain patient groups, rather 
than to weigh up the pros and cons of the decision options that are actively considered. However, we 
describe below a test case, involving an appeal in which NICE was accused of violating non-
discrimination principles by favouring a technology predominantly used to treat a form of cancer linked 
to male occupational exposure to asbestos during the 1970s. The appeal was submitted by a Primary 
Care Trust, doubtless concerned about the financial implications of the recommendation. The appeal 
was rejected, on the grounds that the technology was cost-effective and the TAC had not given any 
special priority to this patient group on the grounds of occupational exposure. This is a potentially 
important test case, as it suggests that non-discrimination pULQFLSOHV GR QRW MXVW DSSO\ WR µwithin-
treatment¶ decisions about restricting the use of the same treatment to one patient sub-group rather 
than another, but may also apply more generally to µbetween-treatment¶ decisions about whether to 
recommend use of one treatment for one condition rather than a different treatment for a different 
condition. 
 
Malignant pleural mesothelioma (MPM) is a type of cancer that occurs in the pleura, the membranous 
lining surrounding the lungs. Presentation and diagnosis often occur at an advanced stage, at which 
point the prognosis for most patients is extremely poor (median survival is nine to 13 months). 
Approximately 90 percent of cases of MPM are linked to asbestos exposure. A wide range of 
occupations, notably those in the shipbuilding, railway engineering and asbestos product manufacture 
industries, are associated with an increased risk of MPM. A peak incidence of MPM is expected in 
men in the 1948 to 1953 birth cohort due to the high utilisation of asbestos in the 1970s. Family 
members of people whose work clothes were contaminated with asbestos fibres have also developed 
MPM. The use of asbestos was banned in the UK in 1999. 
 
In 2008, NICE evaluated the use of pemetrexed with cisplatin for the treatment of MPM (NICE, 2008). 
The results of the pivotal trial showed that this combination treatment confers a survival benefit of 
approximately three months compared with cisplatin alone, as well as offering advantages in terms of 
time to disease progression, tumour response rate and quality of life. The Assessment Group 
estimated an ICER of £34,500 per QALY gained for the patient subgroup comprising the majority of 
MPM patients seen in UK clinical practice, which was higher than the range normally considered 
acceptable. 
 
The TAC considered that the economic analyses may have underestimated the overall quality of life 
benefits offered by pemetrexed combination therapy, whilst potentially overestimating the costs of the 
WUHDWPHQWLQ8.FOLQLFDOSUDFWLFH,WDOVRQRWHGWKDW030LV³DUDUHDQGaggressive malignancy caused 
E\ RFFXSDWLRQDO H[SRVXUH WR DVEHVWRV´ DQG WKDW LW KDV D ³very poor prognosis´. Considering these 
factors together with the available clinical and cost-effectiveness evidence, the TAC agreed that the 
ICER was likely to fall within acceptable levels, and therefore recommended the use of pemetrexed in 
combination with cisplatin as a treatment option for MPM for the defined subgroup. 
 
However, Birmingham East and North Primary Care Trust (PCT) submitted an appeal against this 
decision, alleging that the TAC had failed to take account of the principles of 1,&(¶V own SVJ 
guidance and that the final recommendations were perverse in light of the evidence submitted. The 
PCT alleged, inter alia, that the TAC appeared to have taken into account the fact that MPM is 
typically contracted via occupational exposure. This, in the view of the PCT, was an irrelevant 
consideration. The PCT argued that, in reaching decisions about treatment, NICE should assess 
patients as they present and irrespective of the circumstances which led to them contracting the 
condition. By taking into account occupational exposure, it risked discriminating against patient 
groups and/or on gender grounds. 
 
In response to this point, the Appeal Panel heard that when reaching its conclusion the TAC had 
taken into account those matters relating to the likelihood of greater quality of life benefits and lower 
costs than assumed by the cost-effectiveness analyses. Matters relating to the cause of the disease 
had been noted by the TAC but were not actually factors in its recommendation. The Appeal Panel 
accepted these reassurances and dismissed the appeal on this point. 
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5. Equity concern for reducing unfair health inequalities 
5.1 General SVJs  
NICE distinguishes two approaches to allocating health care resources: the µutilitarian approach¶ and 
the µegalitarian approach¶.  More specifically, ³Whe utilitarian approach involves allocating resources to 
maximise the health of the community as a ZKROH´ ZKHUHDV ³the egalitarian approach involves 
distributing healthcare resources to allow each individual to have a fair share of the opportunities 
DYDLODEOH´ SVJ Guidance, p. 9). The Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal defines a 
reference case assumption that all equal-sized health improvements ³VKRXOGUHFHLYHWKHVDPHZHLJKW
UHJDUGOHVV RI DQ\ RWKHU FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH SHRSOH UHFHLYLQJ WKH KHDOWK EHQHILW´ TA Guide, p.49) 
(often referred to as WKHµD4$/<LVD4$/<LVD4$/<¶UXOH). However, the Institute recognises that 
this simple approach ± which accords with the utilitarian approach as defined above ± may, in some 
circumstances, not be appropriate: treating QALYs equally is not necessarily the same thing as 
treating individuals fairly.  
 
One important dimension of the egalitarian approach defined above is concern to reduce health 
inequalities. This is importantly different from concern to distribute health care according to need, as 
the focus is on health rather than health care. Equal health care is not the same thing as equal health, 
as health care is only one among many important determinants of health.  
 
In general, and in accordance with the relevant equality legislation, NICE seeks to identify 
opportunities for promoting equality in all forms of guidance (SVJ Guidance, p.12; PH Methods, p.10) 
and expects its advisory bodies to ensure that implementing NICE guidance will not widen existing 
inequalities (SVJ Guidance, p.28). ArJXDEO\ KRZHYHU XVH RI WKH WHUP µLQHTXDOLWLHV¶ in this context 
refers to non-discrimination principles and social inequalities in general rather than health inequalities 
in particular. 
 
Specific concern for health inequality reduction is largely confined to NICE documentation relating to 
public health. The Methods for the development of NICE public health guidance document 
HPSKDVLVHV 1,&(¶V FRQFHUQ WR UHGXFH KHDOWK LQHTXDOLWLHV ZKHUHDV WKH Guide to the methods of 
technology appraisal makes little mention of this issue. This suggests that health inequality reduction 
principles have been considered to be more relevant to public health rather than health care 
decisions. However, this is an implicit distinction; there is no explicit ruling that health inequality 
reduction is less relevant to health care decisions. It may also be the case that in a health care 
context it is harder to navigate tensions between equity principles relating to health inequality 
reduction and equity principles of non-discrimination. This tension is clearly brought out in the SVJ 
guidance document. Principle 8 of the Social value judgements: principles for the development of 
NICE guidance GRFXPHQW VWDWHV ³:KHQ FKRRVLQJ JXLGDQFH WRSLFV GHYHORSLQJ JXLGDQFH DQG
supporting those who put its guidance into practice, the Institute should actively consider reducing 
health inequalities including those associated with sex, age, race, disability and socioeconomic 
VWDWXV´ +RZHYHU LW JRHV RQ WR VWDWH ³1,&( VKRXOG QRW UHFRPPHQG LQWHUYHQWLRQV RQ WKH EDVLV RI
LQGLYLGXDOV¶LQFRPHVRFLDOFODVVRUSRVLWLRQLQOLIH1RUVKRXOGLQGLYLGXDOV¶VRFLDOUROHVDWGLIIHUHQWDJHV
affect decisions about cost-effectiveQHVV´SVJ Guidance, p.25). 
 
1,&(GLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQLQHTXLW\DQGLQHTXDOLW\³KHDOWKLQHTXLW\LVFRQFHUQHGZLWKVRFLDOMXVWLFH
value RU SROLWLFV ZKLOH LQHTXDOLWLHV LQ KHDOWK DUH D PDWWHU RI IDFW´ 1,&( JORVVDU\
http://www.nice.org.uk/website/glossary/, accessed 5 August 2011). However, NICE offers little 
specific guidance about the criteria for assessing how far particular health inequalities are unjust or 
unfair or inequitable, or how concern for reducing unfair health inequality is to be balanced against 
concern for improving population health. 
 
One specific recommendation is that, although special efforts need to be made to improve the health 
RI WKH PRVW VRFLDOO\ GLVDGYDQWDJHG JURXSV HIIRUWV VKRXOG ³IRFXV RQ DOO OHYHOV RI WKH >KHDOWK DQG
VRFLRHFRQRPLF@JUDGLHQW´PH Methods, p.12). 
 
A second specific recommendation is that it may sometimes be justified to recommend interventions 
which improve population health but slightly widen health inequalities. For instance, Methods for the 
development of NICE public health guidance states that, iGHDOO\DKHDOWKLQWHUYHQWLRQVKRXOG³EHQHIit 
health in all groups, while reducing health inequities. However this intention may in practice be difficult 
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to achieve. It may be justified in certain circumstances to increase overall population health while 
relative differences between groups remain tKHVDPHRUJHWVOLJKWO\ZRUVH´(PH Methods, p.11). This 
excerpt indicates that the utilitarian approach may be followed at the expense of increasing health 
inequalities in some situations, as the overall increase in health may compensate for the deterioration 
in the distribution. This is important because public health interventions that produce overall health 
improvement often exacerbate relative health differences between the most and least advantaged 
groups in society (PH Methods, p.12). For example, pROLFLHV DLPHG DW UHGXFLQJ KD]DUGV LQ µZKLWH
FROODU¶ZRUNSODFHHQYLURQPHQWVZLOOQRWEHQHILWWKRVHZKRDUHXQHPSOR\HGRUZKRZRUNLQWUDGLWLRQDOO\
lower pay) manual occupations. Thus, there may be a trade-off between achieving overall health 
improvement and reducing health inequities (Graham and Kelly, 2004). Methods for the development 
of NICE public health guidance states that decisions need to be made on a case-by-case basis, and 
that it may be appropriate to apply hybrid actions which contain elements of both universal 
approaches designed to produce overall population health improvement and a targeted focus on the 
most disadvantaged (PH Methods, p.142). 
 
Finally, NICE¶V adherence to the principle of non-maleficence (SVJ Guidance, pp.8-9) suggests that it 
is not permissible to recommend an intervention that may reduce the health of advantaged 
individuals, even though this may reduce health inequality. For example, no-one would seriously 
recommend a policy of free vouchers for cigars and fast food for well-to-do individuals and 
communities, however effective this might be in µlevelling down¶ socio-economic inequalities in health. 
 
5.2 Case-Specific SVJs  
We did not identify any cases to date in which NICE has explicitly departed from the µa QALY is a 
QALY LVD4$/<¶ principle in order to pursue health inequality reduction objectives. It has, however, 
µtaken into account¶ health inequality reduction objectives. Furthermore, as explained below, NICE 
has implicitly departed from this principle by recommending targeted rather than universal versions of 
an intervention. 
 
It is often the case that public health programmes tend to benefit individuals who are already quite 
healthy, and therefore result in increased health inequalities. This is true of smoking cessation 
services, for example, which in the past have been found to be least likely to attract people from 
sectors of the population where smoking rates are high. Hence, when asked to evaluate workplace-
based smoking cessation interventions, PHIAC considered not only the available evidence on the 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the options, but also the fact that the workplace setting offered 
a means of targeting groups that traditionally have been difficult to reach (such as young men), and 
could help therefore to reduce health inequalities (NICE, 2007). However, the cost per QALY gained 
estimate ZDV ZHOO ZLWKLQ 1,&(¶V QRUPDO WKUHVKROG UDQJH anyway, so the intervention could be 
recommended as cost-effective without recourse to giving additional weight to health gains for hard-
to-reach groups.  
 
It is a common feature of PHIAC decision making that the relevant cost per QALY gained estimates 
are ZHOOZLWKLQ1,&(¶VQRUPDOWKUHVKROGUDQJH. Health inequality reduction concerns can therefore be 
addressed without needing explicitly to depart from the µa QALY is a QALY LVD4$/<¶ principle. In 
some cases, however, there may be an implicit departure from this principle when PHIAC 
recommends an intervention targeting disadvantaged populations. This is because it may be possible 
to find a universal form of the same intervention with an even lower cost per QALY gained. Even if the 
targeted intervention has a cost per QALY gained below the £20,000 to £30,000 range normally 
considered acceptable and is therefore cost-effective compared with ordinary displaced programmes 
in the NHS, it may not be cost-effective compared with the universal intervention. Hence it might in 
principle be possible to increase population health by approving the universal intervention rather than 
the targeted intervention. The decision to spend money on the targeted intervention is then an implicit 
decision to depart from µa QALY is a QALY LVD4$/<¶ and to give greater weight to the health gains 
for the disadvantaged population. In such cases, PHIAC itself typically does not explicitly seek to 
calculate whether a more universal variant of an inequality-reducing intervention might be more cost-
effective, so any potential departure remains implicit. 
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6. Discussion 
Our central finding is that, although NICE advisory bodies are authorised to depart from the social 
YDOXHMXGJHPHQWWKDWµD4$/<LVD4$/<LVD4$/<¶ on grounds of equity, they have in practice been 
extremely reluctant to do so explicitly except in the special case of life-extending end of life 
treatments. However, advisory bodies have taken into account a range of equity considerations in 
more implicit ways, without explicitly setting additional weight on QALY gains arising in particular 
circumstances to individuals with particular characteristics.  We can identify three main examples. 
 
First, all advisory bodies follow non-discrimination principles which rule out from consideration any 
decision options that would fall foul of anti-discrimination legislation. This may have an implicit health 
opportunity cost, insofar as some discriminatory options might conceivably be highly cost-effective. 
However, this does not imply that NICE gives additional weight to QALY gains for some patients 
rather than others: rather, it implies that NICE sees non-discrimination as an important ethical 
constraint on the objective of health maximisation.  
 
Second, TACs take into account concern for severity of illness and sometimes make special efforts to 
identify special restrictions on the use of a technology that might allow it to be considered cost-
effective for a severely ill sub-group of patients. This does not explicitly involve special additional 
weight to QALY gains for severely ill patients, since NICE recommends the technology only if these 
special restrictions result in a cost per QALY gained within the range normally considered acceptable. 
 
Third, PHIAC takes into account concern for reducing unfair health inequalities and sometimes 
recommends targeted delivery of health prevention services towards more socially disadvantaged 
individuals or communities. This has not involved explicitly setting special additional weight on QALY 
gains for disadvantaged populations, however, since the reported cost per QALY gain is typically well 
below the range normally considered acceptable. Rather, concern for unfair health inequality is taken 
into account in the prior selection of interventions and decision options for consideration. Arguably, 
however, the decision not to consider other more universal forms of delivery that might be even more 
cost-effective ways of improving population health represents a form of implicit additional weight on 
QALY gains for disadvantaged populations and to have settled the matter at a higher level of decision 
making lifts a burden from PHIAC that it may not feel able to bear. 
 
It remains to be seen whether 1,&(¶Vadvisory bodies will in the future take decisions which explicitly 
imply a special additional weight on QALY gains to severely ill populations, or to socioeconomically 
disadvantaged populations, or to children, or to some other population sub-group that might 
reasonably be argued to have a special additional claim to health resources on equity grounds. The 
reluctance of advisory bodies to do so without specific instruction from the Institute Board is 
understandable, given the complex and politically controversial nature of equity concerns. An explicit 
decision that departs from current practice by giving explicit additional weight to QALY gains for a 
particular population group carries substantial risks of intense media attention, protracted legal 
appeals, and the setting of unhelpful precedents. The risks in giving special additional weight to QALY 
gains for socio-economically disadvantaged populations are obvious, as this carries the logical but 
highly controversial implication that lower weight should be given to QALY gains for socio-
economically advantaged populations. There are also less obvious but nonetheless important risks 
attached to giving special additional weight to QALY gains for severely ill patients, as this carries the 
logical implication that lower weight should be given to QALY gains for less severely ill populations. 
One potentially uncomfortable implication is that lower weight should be given to QALY gains arising 
from preventive public health interventions targeting relatively healthy populations. Another potentially 
uncomfortable implication arises from the fact that spending on patients in their last year of life is 
almost five times as much as for others (Hoover et al., 2002). The principal bearers of opportunity 
costs within the NHS may therefore not be µDYHUDJH¶PHPEHUVRI WKHFRPPXQLW\EXW UHODWLYHO\VLFN
and elderly people to whom a significant priority ought perhaps to be attached on account of their 
severity of illness. Special priority to QALY gains for severely ill patients might therefore imply a 
higher valuation of the health opportunity costs from programmes displaced by NICE-recommended 
technologies, resulting in a less generous threshold range of ICERs and a more stringent cost-
effectiveness test for technologies appraised by NICE.  
 
It may of course be possible to avoid potentially uncomfortable implications of this kind by developing 
a nuanced and context-sensitive set of general QALY weighting principles. However, advisory bodies 
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are not in a good position to do this, as they are charged with making the particular decision in front of 
them and are not able to think through WKH ORJLFDO LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU WKH IXOO UDQJHRI1,&(¶VGHFLVLRQ
making. On the other hand, the Institute Board is naturally reluctant to impose prescriptive new 
guidance on advisory bodies that departs substantially from current practice. As already noted in the 
background section, NICE needs to build and maintain the confidence of a broad range of 
stakeholders with divergent views. For this reason, the Institute Board has always preferred a 
pragmatic incremental approach in which social value judgements are developed in an iterative 
process through cumulative case-based experience and only later (if at all) codified into general 
principles. 
 
Despite this careful, somewhat tentative, approach to social value judgments, the fact that NICE has 
explicitly identified so many of the issues and opened them up for research and public discussion 
must be counted as remarkable pioneering achievements not to be found elsewhere in decision 
making, in the UK or anywhere else, about public investments. It is surely an experience from which 
similar agencies elsewhere might usefully learn. 
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